Introduction
It is now horrifyingly apparent that American prosecution of the war in Iraq, and its attendant detention policies, have been rife with abuses. American soldiers killed Iraqi civilians by throwing them into the Tigris, 2 or shooting them in "massacres" at Haditha 1 J.M. Coetzee, Diary of a Bad Year (New York: Penguin, 2007), 43 (reflecting on American shame in the face of human rughts abuses committed in the course of the war in Iraq.). In a probing critique of this passage, Jeff McMahan argues that "even if there are institutional connections between ordinary Americans and their government that make it rational for them to feel personal shame over its deeds, to suggest that it might be desirable, meritorious, noble, or even morally necessary for them to kill themselves is to attribute vastly disproportionate significance to the grounds for shame." Jeff McMahan, "Torture and Collective Shame," in Anton Leist and Peter Singer, eds., J.M. Coetzee and Ethics: Philosophical Perspectives on Literature (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010). Earlier in his essay, McMahan roundly rejects the notion that the generic American might bear any guilt for the torture of Iraqis. Operating with an unfailingly individualist conception of responsibility, McMahan contends that where he neither participated in torture nor failed to prevent torture that it was in his power to prevent, he cannot be said to bear individual guilt for torture perpetrated by his government. The most that can be ascribed to the generic American is, for McMahan, a kind of moral taint by association. It is for this reason that suicide seems to McMahan so grossly disproportionate -a product of megalomania or else an obsessive need for moral purity. In contrast to McMahan, this essay takes seriously the notion that Americans are individually blameworthy for tortyre, and other human rights abuses, committed in the course of the war in Iraq. Nothing in this essay should be taken to endorse suicide as an appropriate response to America's transgressions, but the arguments advanced herein should nonetheless help to make sense of the sentiment underlying the epigraph. it. 17 Drumbl is prepared to countenance group-based responsibility, but only if individual group members are permitted "the subsequent opportunity … to affirmatively demonstrate why they should be excluded from the liable group." 18 Accordingly, on Drumbl's account, group members who resisted or spoke out against mass atrocity would be exempt from having to contribute to a collective sanction levied against other members of the group. 19 Similarly, others who have entertained the notion of collective instrumental in nurturing the harmful conduct."); Larry May, War Crimes and Just War (New York: Cambridge, 2007), 247-56 (offering a qualified defense of joint criminal enterprise as a kind of collective responsibility where the responsibility of each member turns on his having an intention to participate in the collective injury). 15 Mark Drumbl, Collective Responsibility and Post-Conflict Justice, at 1. See also Mark A. Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment and International Law (New York: Cambridge, 2007): 37 ("[i] nternational criminal culpability is too crude a device to assimilate and measure the small things many people do that make the larger things fewer people do truly pandemic."). 16 Fletcher, supra note 14 at 1513. 17 Fletcher, supra note 14 at 1541-42. 18 Mark Drumbl, Collective Responsibility and Post-Conflict Justice, supra note 15 at 25. 19 Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment and International Law, supra note 15 at 208. Drumbl worries that an assessment that ignores individual culpability will entail not only that the debtor class will include "innocent" group members, but also that the beneficiary class will include complicit group members. Such sanctions in this context contemplate internal rights of contribution, which would allow the group to apportion group-based sanctions according to members' relative amounts of wrongdoing. 20 In short, those who call for a more encompassing understanding of responsibility for atrocity have nonetheless remained faithful to the principle of individual culpability embodied in international criminal law.
By contrast, this paper takes seriously the notion that individuals may bear responsibility for the transgressions of their group even where they do not bear the hallmarks of individual culpability. More specifically, I shall contend that citizenship itself can ground responsibility for the crimes of one's nation-state. To be clear, my interest here lies not in uncovering when and why it is appropriate to hold groups responsible (whether conceived as nations or states), questions addressed by the papers by Toni Erskine and Tony Lang in this volume; nor am I interested in determining the circumstances when, and grounds upon which, it is appropriate to transmit sanctions imposed upon the group to its members, which is the question Richard Vernon and Avia
Pasternak confront in their contributions. I am interested instead in locating and
interrogating the grounds upon which we may, in the first instance, hold group members responsible for a transgression of their group. The focus here is then on responsibility assigned directly to members, and not derivative of the responsibility of the group.
an assessment "would restitute some individuals while unjustly enriching others." Id. at 200. While I go on to defend an assignment of responsibility that Drumbl deems "crude", I see no reason why this assignment could not function alongside a careful delineation of the individuals entitled to compensation. 20 See, e.g., Mark Osiel, "The Banality Juha Raikka is one who has argued that even those who dissociate themselves from their group's wrongdoing may nonetheless warrant blame for that wrongdoing. Juha Raikka, "On Disassociating Oneself from Collective Responsibility," Social Theory and Practice 23 (1997): 93-108. In brief, Raikka argues that dissidents come to bear responsibility for group acts that they oppose where they must participate in, or otherwise support, an evil practice in order to oppose that same or another evil practice. Raikka's account is not as far-reaching as my own, and it is particularly unhelpful here, since it is far from clear that the American opponent of the war in Iraq need participate in any evil practice in order to voice her opposition.
I begin by articulating an account of the relationship between the citizen and her nation-state that grounds the citizen's responsibility for a transgression of her nation-state independent of the extent of her participation in that transgression. I do not anticipate, however, that that account will induce guilt in every American who encounters it. The resistance to guilt is itself interesting and, in the second Part of the paper, I seek to investigate its source. To that end, I undertake an exploration of the moral psychology of guilt and resentment, especially as these emotions pertain to understandings of responsibility for war crimes among members of the perpetrator and victim populations. I end by gesturing to the ways in which the account challenges accepted truths about moral responsibility and its relationship to the reactive attitudes.
Some words about terminology first: By "morally responsible," I shall mean "appropriately subject to blame," which I take to mean the same thing as "blameworthy."
Further, I conceive of the experience of guilt as being constituted, at least in part, by the judgment that one has breached an expectation whose authority one recognizes.
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Whether that experience is also constituted by guilt feelings is a question I shall have occasion to consider in what follows. For now, it is sufficient to note that by "guilt feelings" I shall mean the phenomenological correlates of the judgment involved in experiencing guilt -typically, pain, sadness, etc. 24 Finally, I refer to the entity whose acts occasion responsibility as the "nation-state."
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I. Citizen Responsibility
The notion that one may be held morally responsible for a group wrong not in virtue of one's participation in it but instead in virtue of group membership alone has been termed inquiry into citizens' responsibility by considering two factors that govern the magnitude of a responsibility assignment.
First, and most obviously, responsibility turns on the nature of the injury in question, which we may call the object of responsibility. Thus, the murderer is more blameworthy, ceteris paribus, than is the assailant whose victim sustains only non-lethal injuries. Second, the magnitude of a responsibility assignment varies according to the nature of the individual's relationship to the injury for which we seek to assign responsibility. Thus, for example, Kitty Genovese's assailant bears more responsibility for her death than do the residents of Kew Gardens; the former intends her death, while the latter recklessly refuse her rescue, and thereby contribute to her death. 29 We may refer to this second factor as the ground of responsibility. Now, the claim to be defended in this Part is that all Americans of majority age bear responsibility for American transgressions -that is, the object of responsibility is the same for all. But it is worth noting up front that the ground of responsibility will differ in accordance with the nature of the relationship of each American to the transgression in question. In particular, perpetrators, bystanders and opponents of the transgression each bear a different relationship to it, and these differences entail differences in the magnitude of responsibility to be assigned to members of each camp.
To take one example: The complacent bystander (but not the dissident) has done nothing to diminish the perpetrator's motivation to commit the atrocity in question. To get a better handle on the normative dimension of commitment, it will be useful first to contemplate other, more intimate contexts of commitment. Consider the marital union, for example. Individuals in a marriage must act with a certain regard for 30 To be sure, there may be many complacent bystanders -so many that the causal role of any one of them may be insignificant. But moral responsibility is not a zero-sum matter, with the portion of responsibility for each individual turning on the number of people sharing it. For one thing, that complacency is rampant is a matter of moral luck. The complacent bystander should not be treated more leniently, then, just because others join him in providing psychic support to the atrocity's perpetrators. Indeed, we might say something even stronger than this: Each of these bystanders reinforces the complacency of the other, and thereby comes to bear responsibility not only for the atrocity the complacency supports but also the complacency itself. Similarly, individuals in a joint business partnership must each also operate with a certain regard for the joint venture, and commit themselves to working out the kinks of the operation before contemplating dissolution. And, where one partner is empowered to, say, manage the partnership's business, the other partner may not publicly disparage the result, and disavow responsibility for it. To do so would be to make a fool of the producing partner, and to exhibit a reproachable lack of loyalty. Now, we should note that the strength of the obligations each member of the joint venture bears to the other(s) will depend on the strength of the commitment the joint venture expects of its members. Thus spouses typically have greater obligations of fidelity to each other than do business partners since a marriage typically demands more of the individuals comprising it than does a business venture. Nonetheless, some amount of fidelity follows from membership in the partnership just as it does in the marital union.
Mutatis mutandis, I shall now argue, some amount of fidelity follows from membership in the joint project that is the United States. By way of establishing this point, I offer first some general remarks about the ways in which citizenship can entail a commitment of the kind that grounds responsibility. I then describe the ways in which America might be understood as a joint project. here would not extend to these excluded citizens either.
Nonetheless, there is good reason to think that American citizenship is more than sufficiently robust to comprehend the normative elements -in particular, the demand that citizens stand together in judgment --that, I have argued, ground the citizen's responsibility. There are multiple ways in which one could draw out the normative project of the United States. For our purposes, it will suffice to focus on the quasithey risk exculpating disaffected or alienated citizens, and perhaps threaten unwarrantedly to implicate outsiders who identify with the country in question.
spiritual understanding of the nation's mission, and the connection to martyrdom that this understanding yields. everywhere"), and John Kerry ("we have moved closer to the America we can becomefor our own people, for the country, and for the world."). 37 In the wake of the attacks of worth noting that jury duty is also indicative of the normative commitment American citizens bear. So important a civic service is jury duty that, in some jurisdictions, sheriffs are empowered to seize individuals eligible to sit on a jury and deliver them to court, where the court finds that it does not have enough people present to empanel a jury, see, e.g., California Code of Civil Procedure Section 211 -a process viewed as kidnapping, by some lights. Peter Spiro, whose general project is to argue that territorially defined citizenship no longer tracks the affective ties upon which citizenship should be grounded, contends that today it makes little sense to restrict jury service to citizens: "[I]f one takes seriously the proposition that criminal defendants are entitled to a jury of their peers, the practice [of excluding resident aliens] looks more like a deprivation of a right rather than an exemption from a duty." Spiro, supra note 40 at 99. Against Spiro's critique, one might argue that eligibility for jury duty is not about whether the prospective juror counts as a "peer" but instead whether she is entitled to stand in judgment -an understanding of the obligation more congenial to the conception of citizenship I advance. On that conception, I would argue, citizens are specially placed to hold one another to the laws to which both should be committed, and that both should affirm. 45 Kahn, supra note 44 at 98. 46 Spiro, supra note 40 at 97. See generally George Kateb, Patriotism and Other Mistakes (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 7 ("How is patriotism most importantly shown? Let us not mince words. The answer is that it is most importantly shown in a readiness, whether reluctant or matter of fact, social or zealous, to die and to kill for one's country."). 47 In this volume, David Luban offers a critique of the state cast as jealous god, demanding its citizens' lives when its own existence is threatened, and fighting wars against other states with near impunity. While I find his critique compelling, my purpose here is simply to describe, and not evaluate, the cultural phenomenon in question.
To be sure, the prospect of being called to the battlefield is remote for most Americans. Nonetheless, there are moments in Americans' lives -moments of "extraordinary politics," as Bruce Ackerman refers to them -when Americans are called upon to transcend the pursuit of self-interest in deference to the needs of the country or their compatriots. 48 This transcendence may be less difficult for Americans than others to effect, given that Americans rank higher than any other people on patriotic sentiment. "Those who won our independence believed … that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government. They recognized … that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies. … Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended the Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be guaranteed." Id. at 375 (footnote omitted). Cf. Andrew Mason, "Special Obligations to Compatriots," Ethics 107 (April 1997): 444. ("The idea that we have a special obligation to our compatriots to participate fully in public life has been thought to include or entail various specific obligations, such as an obligation … to keep a watchful eye on government and speak out when it acts unjustly.") state is not a feature of the citizen's identity that sits comfortably alongside, and sometimes even transcends, other sources of affinity.
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The foregoing provides insight into not only the generic American's responsibility for abuses in Iraq but that of the American opponent of the war as well, for the dissident also harbors a commitment to the nation-state. Indeed, it is in virtue of this commitment that the dissident enacts her opposition: She believes that the pursuit and conduct of the war in Iraq grossly betray values she takes to be fundamental and sacred to her beloved country, and her opposition is intended to restore America to its rightful path (or her conception of it, anyway). Were she not so committed to the United States, she might well have sought to leave it. Having stayed, however, she must accept that its acts redound to her. Just as the non-producing business partner may not disown the products of his partnership so the dissident may not disown the acts of the United States.
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In short, the commitment inherent in American citizenship grounds the American's responsibility for the United States' acts, and the expected strength of that commitment determines the magnitude of responsibility she bears through citizenship alone. 53 Four qualifications round out this part of the account. First, given that 51 Cf. Citrin, supra note 49. 52 Richard Vernon argues, in his contribution, that the mere fact that a citizen supports the project of the nation-state need not entail that she bears responsibility for any acts undertaken in furtherance of that project. In particular, where the citizen valiantly opposes the acts in question, Vernon contends, her opposition ought to thwart an attempt to hold her responsible. After all, to will the end is not to will the means, Vernon pithily reminds us. To be clear, then, the ground of responsibility on my account is different from the one that Vernon critiques. For one thing, the dissident would come to bear responsibility for a national wrong on my account even if the wrong proved ineffective at protecting or promoting the nationstate. More generally, the dissident's commitment need bear no relationship -teleological, motivational, or otherwise --to the misdeed of her compatriots in order for her to merit responsibility for that misdeed. Instead, the ground of the dissident's responsibility follows from an obligation of fidelity that she owes her fellow citizens in virtue of their shared membership in the larger enterprise of the nation-state. 53 In this volume, Avia Pasternak advances an account of citizenship as an associative obligation that resonates well with the conception of citizenship articulated here. Nonetheless, I do not agree with Pasternak that her account can justify an equal distribution (ED) of burdens among citizens. Instead, it seems to me that the "solidary" nature of citizenship would be disrupted if each citizen were to carry an commitment to the nation-state licenses our holding citizens responsible, it is expected only of those individuals who qualify as moral agents. The agency requirement follows from the conditions under which it would be permissible to hold an individual responsible for her own acts. Citizens who do not satisfy the criteria for individual responsibility ought not to bear responsibility derived exclusively from their group affiliations.
Second, I here assume that it is possible to measure the extent of expected or actual commitment, but I do not offer a methodology for doing so here, leaving that task instead to sociologists and psychologists. Third, I assume further that, in the United
States, the expected strength of commitment is the same for all citizens who have reached the age of majority. Thus, the generic American and the U.S. perpetrator of war crimes in Iraq will both bear equal responsibility for these war crimes in light of their citizenship.
The perpetrator will, in addition to the responsibility she bears qua citizen, bear responsibility qua perpetrator. We should then expect the perpetrator's responsibility to be significantly greater than that of the generic American. But there is nonetheless some (non-zero) amount of responsibility appropriately assigned to the generic American citizen.
Finally, I do not venture to spell out the nature of the sanctions appropriate to generic Americans simply in virtue of their citizenship except to say that I assume that equal burden independent of the extent of his or her participation in the state transgression in question. Far from fostering solidarity, an insistence upon an equal distribution in the face of differential contributions to the wrong might instead prompt friction between citizens, as those who did not participate in the wrong rightfully awaited exoneration -or at least relief from the sharing of burdens -from those who did participate. My account, by contrast, seeks to be sensitive to the different kinds of relationships citizens can have to a transgression of their nation-state, and to adjust the magnitude of responsibility accordingly. At the same time, it views citizenship as an inescapable ground of responsibility, and in that way may well honor the good of citizenship that Pasternak helpfully and lucidly identifies, without fomenting the resentments to which, I worry, her account may give rise. That theorists like Drumbl who appreciate the collective character of atrocity nonetheless deny that blameworthiness can arise independent of individual fault should give us pause. For it turns out that there are deep psychological currents that make an individualist stance difficult to overcome, as we shall now see.
II. Citizen Responsibility and the Reactive Attitudes
I noted at the outset that an American who did not support the war in Iraq might resist the idea that she bears responsibility for abuses committed in its course. Even were she to encounter the arguments of the last Part, she might nonetheless maintain -with full honesty -that she harbors no guilt over American war crimes committed in Iraq. More specifically, the citizen in question might lack the unpleasant sensation of guilt, and she might also resist the belief that she has acted wrongly. Her response provides an occasion to assess the relationship between bearing guilt, experiencing guilt, and feeling guilt -or, put more generally, the relationship between responsibility, the reactive attitudes, and their accompanying sensations.
I seek to argue here that although our paradigmatic experience of responsibility involves the blamed individual's felt guilt and acknowledgement of wrongdoing, an assignment of responsibility may well be warranted even where one or both of these pieces are absent. This is not an uncontroversial claim. On some conceptions of responsibility, a judgment of responsibility is believed to be constituted by one or more reactive attitudes; 56 and, on some conceptions of the reactive attitudes, emotions are themselves believed to be constituted by feeling-sensations. 57 How, then, can we arrive at a justified assignment of responsibility where the citizen -when presented with the grounds of her responsibility --neither responds to herself with guilt nor has any kind of guilt sensation? Put differently, how can it at once be appropriate for the Iraqi to resent the American and the American to forswear remorse?
To answer these questions, I begin with the case of the dissident. may nonetheless maintain that her dissidence functions as a defense. More specifically, the dissident may believe that her acts of resistance more than offset her commitment to the United States, and so exempt her from responsibility. As such, she does not judge herself to have acted wrongly and, accordingly, feels no guilt. In the first Section of this Part, I attempt to make sense of her experience of her relationship to U.S. transgressions in light of resentment that victims of these transgressions might direct toward her.
The generic citizen is situated differently from the dissident. He cannot call upon a set of activities that purportedly tempers or eliminates his responsibility in order to explain his self-asserted innocence. Instead, he invokes the absence of guilt feelings -his own, as well as those of most of his compatriots --as a defense in itself: "Were we who didn't participate morally responsible," this imagined citizen might argue, "at least many of us would feel guilt. But most of us do not feel guilt, so it is doubtful that we are morally responsible." In the second Section of this Part, I inquire into his response.
Finally, in the last Section of this Part, I draw out some of the implications of the insights of the first two sections for philosophical thinking about moral responsibility.
A. Dissidence and Divergent Viewpoints
The dissident believes that her resistance cancels out whatever responsibility she should come to bear in virtue of her commitment to the United States as a whole. She has arrived at this self-judgment because she has synthesized the dimension of her identity that flows from her citizenship and the dimension of her identity that flows from her dissidence and arrived at a coherent conception of herself in which her dissidence is much more definitive of who she is. But though each of us is empowered to perform this synthesis and arrive at a self-understanding that makes sense of the disparate and sometimes conflicting strands of our identity, none of us is entitled to have others conceive of us as we conceive of ourselves. In particular, the dissident cannot legitimately expect that her self-understanding will govern the Iraqi's conception of her; he is entitled to believe that citizenship looms larger as a constituent element of an American's (or anyone's) identity than do acts opposing the policies or practices of one's government. And, so long as he does hold this belief, he will harbor resentment toward the American citizen, no matter how valiant her efforts at resistance.
The divergence just described arises from differing conceptions of the relative weights to place upon commitment to one's nation-state, on the one hand, and resistance to its acts, on the other, in constructing the dissident's individual identity. But there is a second possible source of separation between the dissident and the Iraqi that arises from a divergence between the conception of America that each harbors. As we have seen, the dissident may undertake opposition to the war in Iraq because she conceives of an America in which the prosecution of the war in Iraq has been distinctly un-American.
Indeed, it might be precisely because she harbors a vision of America as different from, and better than, the America of recent times that she is motivated to resist, and thereby restore her beloved nation-state to her imagined conception of it. 58 But just as she must recognize that her self-conception is not authoritative for others, so too she must recognize that her conception of America must also yield, at least sometimes, to that of outsiders. Thus an Iraqi might detect a cultural imperialism in the quest to "liberate" his country, and an exceptionalism in the potential impunity with which high-ranking U.S.
officials have violated the laws of war, that strike him as unmistakably American. Rooted in his perspective on America, the Iraqi might find the dissident's commitment to America all the more reproachable.
Importantly, in each of the sources of resentment just described -the first rooted in divergence over the dissident's identity, and the second rooted in divergence over the identity of America -there may be no principled way of adjudicating between the competing conceptions. This is not to say that there cannot be cases in which one or the other party may be mistaken: the dissident could harbor a kind of false consciousness, 59 or the Iraqi might operate with an unduly prejudiced mindset. In each of these cases, evidence could be invoked to bring the mistaken party to see things differently. But I see no reason to believe that every case is of this kind. Individuals and nations are complex, multi-faceted entities, admitting of multiple constructions and narratives, and there may well be several of these that synthesize the constituent elements equally plausibly. In short, there may be an unbridgeable gap between the dissident and the Iraqi, and it is in the face of this gap that resentment may rightfully take hold.
Where there is an insuperable divergence regarding the dissident's blameworthiness, we might well want each party to recognize it, and proceed with humility. Thus, we might ask that the dissident resist disclaiming responsibility, and the Iraqi withhold contempt, despite the fact that each holds fast to his or her respective beliefs about the dissident's relationship to the United States. But we might also allow that there are situations in which forbearance is too much to demand. Thus, the Iraqi who lost a family member in the Haditha massacre might, given his loss and also his not completely baseless belief in American prejudice against Muslims of middle-eastern descent, 60 be permitted his resentment.
Here a kind of cognitive dissonance arises. To inhabit the dissident's perspective on America and herself, the Iraqi must abandon a stance of righteous anger through which he might seek to vindicate the worth of his lost loved one, or the Iraqi people as a whole. He must instead contend with the notion that he cannot find an outlet in blame for his loss and injury that corresponds sufficiently to their (perceived) magnitude. He would then incur not just the pain of his tragedy but the profound burden of self-restraint in stifling his own sense of the injury and deferring to that of one of his (apparent) injurers.
Should we really reproach him for spurning this path? Given the additional pain of forbearance, is he not entitled to presume the legitimacy of his own perspective, and proceed with resentment?
61
Ideally, individuals should be given some latitude in making sense of tragedies that befall them. That latitude ought not to be so great that it permits blaming innocents.
But where one possible interpretation is more comforting than another and the two are equally plausible, the more comforting interpretation should prevail. Here, then, the Iraqi . 61 In principle, there may also be cases in which a dissident might be permitted to disclaim, given how violative an ascription of blame for national transgressions is to her vision of her nation-state and herself. I assume here, however, that the transgressions committed against Iraqis are so egregious that it wouldn't be plausible to think that the Iraqi victim's resentment ought to give way to the American dissident's selfconception.
may legitimately indulge his resentment. 62 This does not, of course, entail that the dissident is compelled to feel guilt --feelings, after all, cannot be compelled. Nor does it entail that she must internalize the Iraqi's assessment of her responsibility. But, though the dissident may inwardly maintain her innocence, she must nonetheless accept that she is an appropriate object of blame. Just as the dissident bears an obligation of loyalty to her fellow members to refrain from disavowing the group act, so too she bears an obligation of decency to the victims of her group's transgression to do the same.
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The foregoing is intended to suggest that the warrant for resentment need not rest exclusively on an undeniable wrongdoing. It can instead arise where an individual conceives of the harm he suffers as a wrongful injury, and where his understanding of the harm is no less reasonable than is the understanding of the resented party. It follows, then, that resentment can be justified even when the target of resentment cannot recognize her wrongdoing, and this not because she is constitutionally impaired in some way (as the psychopath is) but instead because she rejects the victim's interpretation of 62 The philosophical literature on resentment contains a debate about whether resentment is, all things considered, a useful emotion or instead one that is self-debasing. … he has a perfect understanding of how to keep silent, how not to forget, how to wait, how to make himself provisionally small and submissive."). To the extent that I here promote resentment as an important implement in allowing the victim of atrocity to make sense of his lot, I align myself with those who defend the usefulness of resentment. 63 Insofar as the argument here permits us to blame, and hence condemn, someone who is not unequivocally culpable, it might be accused of unwarrantedly relying upon a retributivist conception of justice. In her contribution to this volume, Erin Kelly exhorts us to abandon retributivist conceptions of justice, where retribution is pursued for its own sake, given the natural and social factors that often undermine human agency. She nonetheless allows that retribution might be permissible for the sake of some other social good. One who is moved by Kelly's rejection of retributive justice for its own sake might nonetheless find no objection with assigning blame to the dissident, given that the assignment may be therapeutic for the victim of the wrong, and that the dissident does bear some relationip to the wrong, even if not the relationship that retributive justice ought to require.
her relationship to the wrong. Correspondingly, indignation can be justified even where its target denies wrongdoing, for third-parties too might harbor a conception of the injury that implicates someone who does not conceive of herself as culpable, and here too the two conceptions may be equally plausible.
In short, resentment and indignation are meaning-creating emotions, and the circumstances in which they are appropriate are not always clear. Where there is genuine uncertainty about their warrant, it may well be the case that we ought to defer to the interpretation of the injury that confers meaning on the party most in need of making sense of his situation.
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B. Citizen Responsibility and the Emotions
The generic citizen -the one who neither supported nor opposed the war -may insist that he too is an inappropriate object of resentment, notwithstanding his commitment to the Others who have contemplated the absence of guilt among members who did not participate in a group transgression have raised the possibility that the responsibility of these members is not strictly moral responsibility -i.e., responsibility understood as appropriate liability to blame; it is instead a highly personal response to a tragedy in which one chooses to see one's agency, though one in fact bears no guilt for the wrong.
Given that the experience of responsibility is optional on this possibility, the generic citizen who disclaims responsibility is then one who has simply opted not to conceive of his agency in this way. Importantly, for each of these theorists, whether the member who did not participate in the group transgression conceives of herself as bearing responsibility for that transgression is a matter over which she alone has authority. For Jaspers, the German citizen's metaphysical guilt is something no one else can "prescribe" or "anticipate"; 69 whereas others may sit in judgment where political or legal guilt is concerned, Underlying each of these accounts is the thought that an individual has full discretion about whether she will harbor the identificatory ties upon which the experience of responsibility is purportedly predicated. Since, on these theories, these ties may not be mandated from without, neither may the sense of responsibility that they yield.
These theorists may well be right that identification is discretionary in some cases; it is not, however, discretionary in the context of an institutional group like the United States, as I sought to argue in the last section. Instead, as we saw, American citizenship has a normative dimension that compels the citizen to accept blame for U.S.
transgressions. To understand the generic citizen's response to the claim that he is responsible, then, we will have to look to something other than theories that entertain discretionary guilt experiences. 71 If guilt does have the natural history just described, then we should not expect cases of wrongdoing that do not fit the paradigm -again, a paradigm in which we bear significant causal responsibility for the wrongs for which we are held responsible 79 -to elicit the feeling of guilt. And, without the phenomenological correlates of guilt, the judgment that we are guilty may not be accessible to us through the first-personal experiences upon which we typically rely to illuminate the moral character of our acts.
But the impediment to experiencing guilt need not entail that we do not bear a reproachable connection to the wrongdoing. An understanding of guilt's evolutionary role opens up the possibility, then, that our emotional life may track only a subset of the wrongs for which we bear responsibility. This possibility warrants further consideration. 77 Jaspers, supra note 59 at 68. I do not mean to endorse here the part of Jasper's account that leaves the experience of metaphysical guilt to the individual's conscience. Nonetheless, the term "metaphysical guilt" may well be apt for cases in which one views oneself as culpable in a wrong for which one is not causally responsible. 78 See, e.g., Morris, supra note 32 at 137 (describing the experience of non-moral guilt as "a feeling of shame, perhaps before God, because of the evil done by any human being, as if some defect in us were revealed by what any human being did."); May, supra note 30 at 155 ("moral shame or taint may be the appropriate moral feeling" in instances "when a person's causal agency is not in question, or at least when the causal role one played did not make a difference in the world.") 79 I use the "significant" qualifier because I believe that the citizen does bear a causal relationship to the wrongs of her nation-state, though not one that itself grounds her responsibility. Elsewhere, I have argued that all citizens furnish the nation-state's capacity to act by sustaining the identity of the nation-state over time, and preserving the rules according to which the acts of some citizens qualify as acts of the nationstate. See Sepinwall, supra note 55. To that extent, all citizens causally contribute to the nation-state's acts. But this notion of causality is atypical. In everyday ascriptions of causal responsibility, causality is restricted to instances when one's contribution made a difference to the outcome. Insofar as no individual citizen can be said to have made a difference in furnishing the nation-state's capacity to act, it is not inappropriate to think that the casual contribution flowing from citizenship alone is insufficient to make each and every citizen causally responsible for each and every act of the nation-state. To say that the generic citizen does not bear a significant causal relationship to a transgression of the nation-state is, then, just to say that he did not participate in the transgression in question.
C. Citizen Responsibility and Licensed Blame
I have argued that resentment may be appropriate even though guilt is not (the case of the dissident), and that one may bear guilt even though the feeling of guilt is universally absent or even universally inaccessible (the case of the generic citizen). As I have characterized them, then, these cases sit uncomfortably alongside several core ideas within philosophical understandings of moral responsibility. In particular, these cases challenge the idea that judgments of moral responsibility are constituted by a particular triad of reactive attitudes, and the idea that judgments of responsibility are constituted by reactive attitudes in general. Most fundamentally, these cases challenge the notion that blameworthiness presupposes guilt. I elaborate on each of these implications in turn.
In the literature linking responsibility and the reactive attitudes, it is nearly a gospel truth that guilt, resentment, and indignation co-travel. 80 More specifically, on these accounts -which we may call Strawsonian after Peter Strawson's seminal paper --one and the same transgression is supposed to induce guilt in the person who carries it out, resentment in its victim, and indignation in third-parties who learn of it. 81 But I have argued that, in the case of the dissident, the supposed triad of guilt, resentment and indignation dissolves: The dissident may be an appropriate object of resentment and indignation even if she need not conceive of herself as guilty. In other words, there may be asymmetries between the self-reactive attitudes and other-directed reactive attitudes.
The situation for the Strawsonian gets worse when we turn to the reflections on the natural history of guilt marshaled above. For the Strawsonian, moral salience is brought to light through the emotions. If I am right that our emotional vocabulary is limited where our causal agency is absent, however, then there may be a whole swath of acts or outcomes for which we bear responsibility and to which we are blind. The blindness becomes troubling where it is not universal -in particular, where victims or third-parties assign responsibility to us and we are incapable of experiencing the corresponding self-assessment. But it is also possible that our relationship to some wrong will elicit no guilt, no resentment and no indignation. This possibility arises because those who judge us may be no less primed to view responsibility through a causal lens than we are, and so they too might overlook the fact that we -now cast as generic members of institutional groups in whose transgressions we have not participateddeserve blame. On this possibility, then, there would be blameworthiness that no emotion could disclose. And yet it is not clear that the interests or status of the individuals affected by the blameworthy act would thereby warrant any less vindication.
Finally, it is not just the Strawsonian understanding of responsibility that occludes judgments of responsibility in cases where we bear a non-causal relationship to the wrong. It is a commonplace across the literature on responsibility that it is a necessary condition of X's being morally responsible for Y that it be appropriate for X to experience guilt in relation to Y. 82 But the account of citizen responsibility I have 82 See, e.g., Gibbard, supra note 76 at 126 ("a person is to blame for something if it would make sense for him to feel guilty for having done it…."); Stephen Darwall, The Second Person Standpoint: Morality, advanced dispenses with the supposedly necessary connection between moral responsibility and the appropriateness of guilt. More specifically, on my account, one need not experience guilt in relation to some wrong in order to bear moral responsibility for it; sometimes, the fact that others would be licensed in blaming us is enough to ground our moral responsibility.
In sum, then, the account of responsibility advanced here entails not only a dissolution of the guilt-resentment-indignation triad. That account also exposes the implicit primacy accorded to guilt, relative to the other two members of the triad, and it invites us to unseat guilt from its pride of place, and replace it with resentment instead. In the face of legitimate disagreement about the warrant for blame, it is, then, victims, and not wrongdoers, whose perspectives should prevail.
More generally, the account of membership responsibility implies that we may be implicated in wrongs in ways that we do not feel and do not see. Our moral reality may then transcend the scope of our emotional awareness. As such, we ought to be open to the possibility that we bear responsibility for more of the transgressions of our nation-state than we think. Americans, that is, ought to be open to the possibility that they bear responsibility for U.S. war crimes committed in the course of the war in Iraq.
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Respect, and Accountability (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 71 ("Guilt feels like the appropriate (second-personal) response to blame: an acknowledgment of one's blameworthiness that recognizes both the grounds of blame and, more importantly for us, the authority to level it (even if only "to God"). To feel guilt, consequently, is to feel as if one has the requisite capacity and standing to be addressed as responsible…."). Susan Wolf captures the position in question thusly: "guilt is the emotion one feels or should feel in proportion to how much one judges oneself blameworthy. 
